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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of foreign investments on a small countrys econ-
omy in the context of international competition. To that end, we model tax and pub-
lic input competition within a di¤erential game framework between two unequally
sized countries. The model accounts for the widely recognized characteristic that
small states are more exible in their political decision making than larger countries.
However, we also acknowledge that small size is associated with limited institutional
capacity in the provision of public services. The model shows that the long-term out-
come of international competition crucially depends on the degree of capital mobility.
In particular, we show that exibility mitigates against - but does not eliminate - the
likelihood of collapse in a small economy. Finally, we note that the benecial e¤ect of
exibility in a small state increases with its ine¢ ciency in providing public services
and with the degree of international openness.
Keywords: Tax/public input competition, Open-loop/Markovian strategies, Dif-
ferential games.
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1 Introduction
Small states generally su¤er from limited access to capital and labor resources, both in
amount and in variety. Then, foreign direct investments (in short, FDI, hereafter) can
contribute signicantly to the development of small states (Read, 2008). In fact, small
economies tend to have high level of access to private foreign capital as a ratio of total
capital formation (Streeten, 1993). Using data from the World Bank, Figure 1 suggests
that the ratio of FDI ows to the gross xed capital formation is higher in small countries
(i.e., population less than two million)1 than in large countries (i.e., population in excess of
30 million)2. Moreover, the economic well-being of small countries is positively correlated
with the ratio of FDIs. The data in Figure 1 indicate that small countries above the
average line, such as Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus or Estonia, exhibit a high level of per
capita GDP, whereas small countries below this threshold have a lower level of per capita
GDP. This is conrmed in Figure 2, which suggests that a direct relationship exists between
the level of GDP per capita and foreign investments in small economies. In the cluster of
larger countries, however, this relationship is hardly apparent.3 Countries, such as Poland,
Italy, Turkey, India and Spain appear above the threshold in Figure 1, whereas the USA,
Ukraine, Nepal, Greece among others, are situated below it.4
Given these facts, this paper analyzes the impact of foreign investment ows on the
economic performance of a small country competing internationally for mobile production
factors. In this context, we investigate the conditions undder which the economies of such
countries can be viable, or even expand, in the long term. To that end, we develop a
dynamic framework to study how a small country attracts foreign capital through two
policy instruments, namely taxes and public services.5
1Our data set contains 51 countries with population less than 2 million. This represents 72% of all
the existing "small" countries. An exhaustive description cannot be provided due to a lack of relevant
information.
2Our data set of countries with population in excess of 30 million is exhaustive. It contains 41 countries.
3Note that, we have not controlled for other determinants of per capita GDP; for example, the avail-
ability of natural resources. Taking into account oil reserves and the recent increase in oil prices would
explain the position of Qatar or Brunei in our gures.
4The ambiguous role of FDIs on the economic performance of countries is documented in the literature
(see, for example Alfaro et al. 2004).
5These public services contribute to the domestic attractiveness of private capital, as they are supposed
to enhance private productivity. Examples of this are spending for the operation and maintenance of
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For the sake of simplicity, we focus on two competing countries of uneven size. In this
study, size is dened as number of capital-owners in a respective country and these capital
owners are simultaneously entrepreneurs and workers. By adopting this approach, our
model focuses on the economic size of a country.
The dynamic aspect of international competition is addressed by a di¤erential game
framework in which the strategic behavior of the small country di¤ers from that of its
larger rival. We account for the widely recognized characteristic that small states are more
exible in their political decision making than much larger countries (see, in particular,
Streeten, 1993).
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Figure 1: Relationship between the ratio of FDIs to Gross Fixed Capital Formation and
population from 2000 to 2010. Source: World Bank
power and transportation infrastructures, operating costs of universities, but also the enforcement of
property rights and the provision of capital market, labor and environmental regulations. It follows that
countriesattractiveness may also be due to the quality of their institutions. In the Oxford Handbook
of Entrepreneurship (2007), it is argued that the abundance of entrepreneurs in a country depends on
the existence of regulations, property rights, accounting standards and disclosure requirements, among
other factors. Furthermore, in recent years, there has been a surge of national and cross-country studies
relating economic development to institutions, especially institutions a¤ecting capital market development
and functionality (see, for example, La Porta et al.,1997).
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Figure 2 : Relationship between GDP per capita of small countries and the ratio of FDIs
to Gross Fixed Capital Formation from 2000 to 2010. Source: World Bank
We thus assume that the small country adopts a Markovian feed-back behavior (i.e.,
the policy variables are continuously reset in response to the dynamics of the states of
the world), whereas the larger country chooses an open-loop rule (i.e., the policy variables
are set only once at the initial time). We also acknowledge that small size is associated
with handicaps, as, small economies are generally characterized by limited institutional
capacity in the provision of public goods (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000) relative to
large countries. Finally, we assume that the capital owners living in both countries have
heterogeneous attitudes toward their attachment to home. Thus, they incur costs related to
moving abroad. The extend of these costs depends on their attitudes toward their countries.
Additionally, their decision to relocate their capital is a¤ected by capital taxation and by
productivity-enhancing public services.
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, the model shows
that GDP, in particular the GDP per capita, of the small country increases with the ow of
FDIs, which is consistent with the facts presented above. Moreover, the long-run solutions
show that the economy of the small country can expand, shrink or even collapse. In this
context, two cases can be distinguished: one exhibits high international openness and
4
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another exhibits low international openness. The fundamental di¤erence between these
cases is that the small country will only experience economic collapse if capital mobility
is high (i.e., high international openness). However, higher e¢ ciency in the provision of
public services can partially countervail this e¤ect by decreasing the likelihood of collapse.
In the second case, when capital mobility is low, international competition for capital can
eventually reduce the size of the small economy without provoking its collapse. If capital
mobility is very low, the model shows that international competition tends to expand the
economy of the small country. We also assess the extent to which exibility is benecial to
the small country, given that it su¤ers from limited institutional capacity. By comparing
the Markovian and open-loop outcomes, we nd that exibility mitigates against - but
does not eliminate- the likelihood of a small economy collapse. Finally, we show that the
benet of exibility increases in tandem with the ine¢ ciency of public service provision
and with the degree of international openness in the small country.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, we pro-
vide a dynamic counterpart to previous static papers in which countries compete with two
instruments. Following Zodrow-Mieszkowski (1986) model, there has been a growing body
of literature on the joint role of taxes and public inputs in attracting mobile production
factors. For example, Zissimos and Wooders (2008) analyze how the provision of public
goods designed to reduce the production cost of private rms is able to relax international
tax competition between governments of equal size. Benassy-Quéré et al. (2007) provide
an empirical analysis of the impact of taxes and public goods on the allocation of private
capital. They nd that both corporate taxes and public capital contribute signicantly to
inward FDIs. Pieretti and Zanaj (2011) propose a two-stage game in which both a small
and large jurisdiction compete for capital using taxes and public goods as policy variables.
These contributions are, however, static and thus unable to provide insights into dynamic
outcomes. Di¤erential games have already been applied to oligopolistic competition (Dock-
ner and Jorgensen, 1984, Karp and Perlo¤, 1993, Cellini and Lambertini, 2004); however,
few studies have applied di¤erential games to tax competition. For example, Coates (1993)
deals with the issue of property tax competition and partially analyzes the open-loop equi-
librium of a dynamic game.6 Secondly, by assuming that small countries are more exible
in taking decisions than their larger rivals but at a higher institutional cost as explained
6As mentioned by Cardarelli (2002).
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above, we account for behavioral and institutional asymmetries which, to the best of our
knowledge, are not considered in the traditional tax competition literature.
We assume the economic magnitude expressed in terms of productive resources can
vary endogenously as a consequence of public policy and international competition, while
the political size is xed. Similar to our model, the contribution of de la Croix and Dottori
(2008) is also concerned with the collapse of a community. To explain the tragedy of Easter
Island, these authors show how a closed system can collapse as a result of non-cooperative
bargaining between clans. The context and the methodology of their paper is, however,
di¤erent from ours, given that they use an overlapping generations model in which people
live for two periods and compete in fertility rates.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section models the dynamic competition
between two countries of asymmetric size. In Section 3, we derive long-run solutions and
Section 4 analyzes the long-run conditions of a small country. The importance of exibility
in small economies is assessed in Section 5 and Section 6 presents the conclusion.
2 The model
Suppose that the world is composed of two countries (regions) with unequal populations.
Country size may be dened by population, area, or national income (Streeten, 1993). In
this study, population, rather than area, is used to dene country size. More precisely,
size is dened with respect to the number of capital owners who populate the country
and these capital owners are simultaneously entrepreneurs and workers. By adopting this
approach, our model identies a country by the size of its economy. Furthermore, capital
owners (and their associated activites) are free to relocate to the neighbor country at any
point in time. At time t = 0; capital ows have not yet taken place, so the population size
in each country coincides with its native population.
At t = 0; the population of jurisdictions is evenly distributed with unit density on the
interval [ S1(0); S2(0)]. The small country extends from  S1(0) to the origin 0; and the
rest of the world extends from 0 to S2(0). It follows that the small economy has a size of
S1(0) , and the rest of the world has a size of S2(0), with S1(0) < S2(0). We assume that
the total number of rms is constant over time and is normalized to one. Thus, for any
6
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future time t  0, S1(t) = S(t) and S2(t) = 1  S(t).
Entrepreneurs Each citizen is endowed with one unit of capital which is combined
with her labor to establish a rm. Therefore, all citizens are self-employed entrepreneurs.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we thus use rms and entrepreneurs interchangeably.
The rms are distributed at their respective sub-interval according to their disposition
to establish a rm outside of their home location. As in Ogura (2006), we assume that
this population of entrepreneurs is heterogeneous in the degree of their attachment to the
home country.7 Within the model, we dictate that the closer entrepreneurs are located to
extremes of the interval, the more they are attached to their current location. Conversely,
the closer that rms are to the border 0, the less they are attached to their territory,
and the easier it will be for them to relocate abroad.8 This means that a rm of type
 2 [ S1(0); 0] located in the home country incurs a disutility of relocating abroad equal
to kx, where x is the distance between 0 and . The coe¢ cient k represents the unit cost of
moving capital abroad and can also be interpreted as the degree of international openness.
As in Pieretti and Zanaj (2011), we assume that each rm produces q+ai (i = 1; 2) units
of a nal good, where q is the private component of (gross) productivity. The fraction ai of
the produced good depends on the public input supplied by the home (foreign) jurisdiction.9
Note that the product Si  (q + ai) represents the total output or GDP produced in country
i = 1; 2. This implies that q + ai is the per capita output in a respective country. The
total output is sold in a competitive (world) market at a given price normalized to one.
Thus, we suppose that both countries have equal access to a common market. This also
implies that the smaller jurisdiction does not su¤er from a reduced home market. We
further consider that the unit production cost is constant and equal to zero without loss of
7This characteristic was rst considered in the scal competition research of Mansoorian and Myers
(1993).
8For reasons of simplicity, we assume that rms can only relocate to their neighboring jurisdiction.
9A public input satises the local public good characteristics; that is, it is jointly used without rivalry
by rms located within the same jurisdiction. It follows that the benets and costs of these goods only
accrue at the jurisdictional level. As in Zissimoss and Wooders (2008), we abstract congestion costs .
Incorporating congestion into the model would complicate our framework without qualitatively improving
the results. Moreover, if public input represents immaterial goods as laws and regulations (e.g., protecting
intellectual property and, specifying accurate rules for dispute resolution), the lack of congestion in our
model is justied by the particular nature of these goods.
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generality. Each entrepreneur pays a tax on capital which is denoted by Ti (i = 1; 2) and
levied in the country i = 1; 2.10
The temporal perspective of the setting described above is as follows. For each period
t 2 [t;+1) and for any t > 0, governments update their choices in terms of the public
services and taxes o¤ered.
Suppose that an entrepreneur of type  is initially located in the small country and
considers staying at home or investing her physical capital abroad. If she decides not to
move, her prot is given by11
1(t) = q(t) + a1(t)  T1(t): (1)
If she invests abroad, her prot becomes
2(t) = q(t) + a2(t)  T2(t)  kx(t):
It follows that the marginal entrepreneur x who is indi¤erent between investing abroad
and staying at home veries the condition
q(t) + a1(t)  T1(t) = q(t) + a2(t)  T2(t)  kx(t):
Consequently, we obtain
x(t; a1; a2; T1; T2) =
a2(t)  T2(t)
k
  a1(t)  T1(t)
k
: (2)
In other words, the large country attracts capital (x > 0) from the smaller jurisdiction if
the net gain of investing abroad, a2(t)   T2(t); is higher than the net gain of staying at
home, a1(t)  T1(t) after taking into account the mobility cost kx. If x < 0, capital moves
from the large jurisdiction to the smaller one.
The motion equation of the size of the small countrys economy S(t) is given by
_S(t) =  x = a1(t)  T1(t)
k
  a2(t)  T2(t)
k
: (3)
10Given that each entrepreneur invests exactly one unit of capital in our model, the total tax will be Ti
(i = 1; 2).
11For the sake of simplicity, we consider that q is such that the prot of each rm is positive for all
equilibrium levels of public goods and taxes.
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We further assume that the preferences for the home location will change in the following
way.12 For the rms that do not move, attachment to home will increase by x if the small
economy is attractive to foreign investors (x < 0), and it will decrease if the foreign location
attracts capital from the small country (x > 0). For the capital owners who move abroad,
the higher their attachment to the country they leave, the lower the attachment to the new
location will be.
Governments Adopting a public-choice perspective, we posit that the governments
maximize tax revenue.13 To this end, countries compete simultaneously by using taxes
and public services to attract entrepreneurs, and rms decide where to locate based on
these government policies. We suppose that the e¤ective (net) tax revenue collected by the
governments does not coincide with the gross amount of tax revenue collected. Following
Vaillancourt (1989) and Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992), tax collection is costly due to
the administration, monitoring and enforcing procedures associated with it (Kenny and
Winer, 2006). If the marginal cost of collecting taxes rises, then the net tax revenue R(t)
at time t is a convex function of the collected taxes. For tractability reasons, the net tax
revenue will be given by Ri =
p
SiTi.
The instantaneous objective function of government i(i = 1; 2) is thus given by the
following:
wi(Ti; ai) =
p
SiTi   i
2
a2i ; (4)
where the second term is the cost of providing public inputs, which is assumed quadratic,
whereas i is a country specic e¢ ciency parameter. Indeed, the higher the value of i,
the higher the unit and marginal costs of providing public servive.
The key focus of this paper is the long-run behavior of small states. To this end, we
12After relocation of a subset of rms, the attachment to home will change according to the following
rule. For all e(t) 2 [ S(t); S(t)], we dene e(t) = e(t t) + x, where e(t) = ( (t) 2 [ S(t); O(t)]
(t) 2 [O(t); S(t)]
and O(t) stands for the origin at period t.
13This assumption should not be interpreted in the classical sense given by Brennan and Buchanan
(1980) and applied to Leviathan governments. We do not consider here that regulators are self-interested
governments. We simply assume that collected taxes are used to nance productive public services but
also public goods that do not directly a¤ect the productivity of rms, such as green spaces, swimming
pools, and security bodies.
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highlight two opposing features of small open economies.
First, according to the Commonwealth Secretariat (2000), the public sector of mini-
states generally su¤ers from limited institutional capacity.14 Moreover, it may be di¢ cult
for small states to recruit high-quality civil servants given their limited pool of candi-
dates(Streeten, 1993). These factors can reduce the e¢ ciency and increase the unit costs
for the provision of public services. To account for these facts, we assume that 1   > 2:
Normalizing 2 to 1; we impose  > 1. It follows that  represents the ine¢ ciency of the
small country relatively to the large one.15
Secondly, small size can be considered an asset (Kuznets, 1960; Easterly and Kray, 2000)
given the economic success of many micro-states. Streeten (1993) suggests that problems
related to collective action can be solved more easily in small countries,16 whereas the
larger jurisdiction is not able or not willing to attain this degree of exibility in its decision
making.17 To capture this di¤erence, we assume that the large jurisdiction commits to
a policy path that was adopted at the beginning of the game (i.e., open-loop strategy),
whereas policy-makers in the small jurisdiction adopt a Markovian feed-back strategy.
This mixed representation o¤ers a convenient way of modeling di¤erences in exibility
of decision making (Dockner et al., 2000). Although small in a political sense, the mini-
state can grow larger as a result of sustained capital inows. The small countrys size
could thus exceed a critical threshold that would cause the large country to react more
aggressively by also adopting a Markovian strategy. To rule out such a behavioral change,
14In small states, the median wage bill of the public sector as a proportion of GDP is 31 percent, whereas
the ratio is 21 percent in large developing countries (Commonwealth Secretariat and World Bank, 2000).
15To be consistent, the parameter  should be inversely correlated with the size of the small country.
Taking into account this feature would however complicate the analysis without important additional
insight. Therefore, we shall assume that the small country is tiny enough to consider  as given. For that
reason we assume that the size S1is bounded from above by S where S < 12 :
16These attributes facilitate greater single-mindedness and focus on economic policy-making and a more
rapid and e¤ective response to exogenous change (Armstrong and Read, 1995). Hence, in the present
paper, we assume that the small economy updates its decision variables at each period t and is thus able
to condition its actions based on current observations.
17This could result from the higher costs of social and political heterogeneity. Indeed, after having
reached a policy consensus, changing this policy could be a very sensitive issue in a large country. Moreover,
the extremely small size of the mini-state may inuence thus, given that the large economy may consider
it to be unimportant.
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we assume that the size of the small economy will remain tiny enough. In other words, we
assume that the size S(t) is bounded from above and impose S(t)  S < 1
2
, for any t  0.
The dynamic objective-functions of the competing jurisdictions are respectively18
J1 = max
a1;T1
Z +1
0
e rtw1(T1(S; t); a1(S; t))dt; (5)
J2 = max
a2;T2
Z +1
0
e rtw2(T2(t); a2(t))dt; (6)
where r is the discount rate of the public decision-makers, which should reect the degree
of impatience of the population. Given that there is no evidence that this rate is dependent
on the size of a population, we accept that r is common to both jurisdictions.
3 Steady states and the long-run policy mix
As explained above, we assume that the small jurisdiction adopts a Markovian strategy,
and its larger rival chooses an open-loop approach when designing its optimal decision path.
In the appendix we provide the full solution to this game. The steady state production
potential of the small country is
S^ =
(kr) 
3
2
6
p
2
 p
2

  1
!
+
2
3
:
Note that this steady state is saddle point stable and there is one monotonically con-
vergent path leading to it.19
To guarantee that the production potential of the small country remains smaller than
S < 1
2
in the long term, we impose that k < k =
 
1
2
 1
3 1
r
and  >  =
p
2
1 p2(kr) 32
. The long
18Similar to Barro (1990), we consider that the government provides ows of public services. It follows
that the public service provision will be treated as a control variable.
19We present the convergence path in the appendix.
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run policy mix of countries related to taxes and public services is
ba1 = 1
2

1
kr
 1
2
; bT1 = krbS;
ba2 = 1
2

1
2kr
 1
2
; bT2 = 2kr(1  bS):
These values allow us to dene bai + q as the long-run per capita GDP of country i = 1; 2.
According to the above solutions, it is possible to show that the variable bai 20 increases
with the long-term size of the economy S^: Given that S^ is positively related to FDI inows,
our model is consistent with a stylized fact we highlighted in Figure 2, in which the per
capita output of small economies improves with inward foreign investments.21 This positive
relationship results from spending on public services, which impacts the productivity of
rms and, thus, a¤ects the attractiveness of the location to foreign investments.
We also easily verify that ba2 ba1 = 14  p2   2q 1kr > 0 for  > p2 and bT2   bT1 =
kr

2  3bS > 0, given that bS < 1
2
. In other words,
Proposition 1 The small economy will always undercut tax rates but the public services
it provides will never be attractive to investors.
This result is reminiscent of the ndings reported in the literature on tax competition
among economies of uneven size (Bucovetsky, 1991, Wilson, 1991,Kanbur and Keen, 1993,
Trandel, 1994), according to which the benet of smallness translates into the ability to
undercut the tax rates of larger countries. Contrary to research on inter-jurisdictional com-
petition (based on taxes and public services), our model does not generate an equilibrium,
which occurs when the small economy has higher taxe than its larger rival (Hindriks et al.,
2008, Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011). This does not occur because the small country is at a
disadvantage in providing public services due to the limited capacity of its public sector.
Furthermore, the less e¢ cient the small country is in providing public services, the
more it will implement attractive tax policy. Indeed, the gaps ba2   ba1 and bT2   bT1 rise
20The steady-state value a^i written as a function of S^ is a^i = 3kr(S^i   23 ) + ( 12kr )
1
2 . It follows that
@a^i
@S^i
> 0 is always true.
21In other words, we see that the level of GDP, the GDP per capita and the production potential of the
small country in particular increase with the ow of FDIs.
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with . It should be noted that increasing international openness (lower k) has the same
e¤ect as rising  on both gaps. Thus, the higher the capital mobility, the more the small
country will be inclined to undercut the tax rates of its rival.
Finally, if the long-run solutions have to guarantee non-negative net budget constraints
of both economies, the following two conditions must hold. Either (a) k > k  k with
k = ( 1
32
)
1
3
1
r
, or (b) k veries k < k  k, with k =   1
50
 1
3 1
r
and  satises  <   , with
 = 1
2
p
2 16(kr) 32
. The budget constraint of the large country will be satised if bw1  0, as
there are less stringent conditions on the parameters of the large country than its smaller
rival 22.
4 Will small states survive in the long run?
In this section, we focus our attention on the conditions under which the production po-
tential of the small economy will expand (1
2
> S^ > S(0) ), shrink (S^ < S(0) ) or even
collapse (S^ = 0).23Two cases can be considered according to the degree of capital mobility.
Case 1 High degree of international openness: k < k < k.
In this case, the survival of the small economy depends on its relative e¢ ciency in pro-
viding public services. Two sub-cases can be distinguished: one in which capital mobility
is very high, i.e., k < k < ks with24ks =
1
2 [2 + S(0)])
2
3
1
r
, and a second one in which capital
mobility is moderately high, i.e., ks < k < k. In the rst sub-case, it is readily veried that
the small economy expands in the long run, bS > S(0), if  < . However, if the relative
e¢ ciency of provision of public services in the small economy is too low (i.e., if  > ), it
will collapse. Furthermore, as the mobility cost approaches its lower bound k, the small
country is more likely to collapse. This occurs because the small economy has to lower
its taxes to such an extent that it can no longer sustain its public expenditures (bw1 < 0).
There are two extreme outcomes in the long-run. Either the small economy expands, or
collapses. Therefore, if it shrinks, it must collapse.
22It also appears that bS 2 0; 12 in both (a) and (b).
23We impose (see proof in Appendix A.3) that S(t)  S < 12 . If so,  would depend on the upper bound
of S. Thus, (S) =
p
2
1+6
p
2(S  23 )(kr)
3
2
, in which S is decreasing.
24It is readily veried that ks < k if 0 < S(0) < 12 .
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This extreme scenario changes in the second sub-case. According to the values taken by
, the small economy can expand, collapse and shrink without collapsing. If  < s with
s =
p
2
1 6p2[ 23 S(0)](kr)
3
2
, it will expand, and if  > , it will collapse. For an intermediate
e¢ ciency value, i.e., s <  < , the small country will shrink but still survive.
The following proposition can then be stated:
Proposition 2 Assume that international openness is high. The economy of the small
country can expand if it is relatively e¢ cient in providing public services. Otherwise, its
economy will shrink or even collapse in the long run.
In a world of mobile capital, a small economy may have di¢ culty surviving even if it
is able to adapt to change more quickly than larger countries. This can occur because
the e¢ cient provision of public services and capital mobility are crucial to generating the
resources necessary to a¤ord further public amenities. In fact, the model shows that below
a given threshold, rising capital mobility causes the small economy to cut its taxes to such
an extent that its budgetary resources vanish. It follows that small states, but especially
micro-states, can secure their status in a global economy if their public sectors provide
public services with su¢ cient e¢ ciency and if their tax rates are more favorable than those
of larger countries. At best, this is a necessary condition for attracting foreign capital, or
at least, surviving.
Case 2 Low degree of international openness: k > k > k.
In this case, the relative ine¢ ciency of the provision of public services can no longer
lead to the collapse of an economy because budget resources are not constrained. Formally,
the limit value  tends to 1 if k approaches k. This is in marked contrast with the rst
case, as - in this case- a low degree of nancial openness makes capital more captive and
provides su¢ cient tax revenues to cover public expenditures. At worst, the economy of
the small country can contract (0 < bS < S(0)). This occurs if bk > k > k and  > s,
with bk = ( 1
8[2 3S(0)])2 )
1
3
1
r
. However, if mobility is very low, i.e., k > k > bk, the small
economy will attract foreign capital and thus expand. Surprisingly, this scenario occurs
independently of the level of ine¢ ciency.
We conclude with the following proposition:
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Proposition 3 Assume that international openness is low. The small countrys economic
size never collapses but may shrink if the degree of international openness is not su¢ ciently
low. In either case, the survival of the economy is independent of the e¢ ciency of public
service provision.
We provide a summary illustration of the di¤erent cases with respect to the parameter
values of k and  in Figure 3.
Figure 3 : The evolution of the small countrys economic potential according to the
mobility cost (k) and the degree of public ine¢ ciency ().
5 How important is exibility to the small economy?
To assess how benecial exibility is to the small country, we rst calculate the long-run
production potential eS of the small country if it chooses an open-loop behavior identical
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to its larger rival. We thus obtain
~S =
(kr) 
3
2
4
(
1

  1) + 1
2
:
The benet of exibility can be represented by the di¤erence bS  eS, which is obtained by
comparing the Markovian and open-loop outcomes. It is easy to verify that this di¤erence
is always non-negative. Therefore, given the same parameters, the Markovian behavior
adopted by the small country is preferable to the open-loop behavior. However, exibility
does not completely eliminate the potential for collapse; it only makes its occurrence less
likely.
Given that
@(bS eS)
@
> 0, the advantage of the small countrys exibility increases with
its ine¢ ciency to provide public services. In other words, the economic size of the small
country is more sensitive to an increase in e¢ ciency ( decreases) in the Markovian sce-
nario.25 Consequently, exibility counterbalances ine¢ ciency, and the more ine¢ cient a
small country is in providing public inputs, the more valuable exibility is to its long-run
survival.
Furthermore, higher capital mobility increases the relative advantage of exibility, given
that
@(bS eS)
@k
< 0. Note that increased capital mobility reduces (k increases) the long-term
economic potential of the small economy; however, this occurs to a lesser extent in the
Markovian scenario. It follows that exibility countervails the negative e¤ect of high capital
mobility, and exibility brings greater benets to the small country when capital mobility
is low. So, we can conclude by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 The benet of exibility decreases with the small countrys e¢ ciency to
provide public services and increases with capital mobility.
We nally observe that similar to the Markovian scenario, the small country never col-
lapses by adopting an open-loop behavior when capital mobility is su¢ ciently low. How-
ever, this condition becomes more restrictive in the open-loop scenario. Indeed, the absence
25In fact, it is convenient to verify that
@ bS@  < @ eS@ .
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of exibility in policy making requires now that the mobility cost is higher than k, which
exceeds the threshold k corresponding to the Markovian case.26
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether a small open economy can survive in the long-
run when facing global competition. To this end, we model the dynamic competition
between two unequally sized economies. The policy makers of these two countries compete
simultaneously by taxing mobile capital and o¤ering public services. Firms choose to
locate their capital in the country where their prots are maximized. We characterize the
heterogenous behaviors of the two governments within a di¤erential game framework, in
which the small state adopts Markovian (i.e., exible) behavior, and its larger rival commits
to a strategy developed at the initial time point (i.e., open-loop behavior).
The results show that under conditions of high capital mobility, the small economy will
risk economic collapse if it provides public services ine¢ ciently. When capital mobility is
very low, the economy of the small state always expands despite its limited institutional
capacity.
However, further research is needed. In the present study, countries are treated solely
as maximizers of tax revenue, and this over-emphasizes the role of tax rates in the long-run
outcomes. Therefore, it would be interesting to analyze a scenario in which governments are
welfare maximizers and take into account the well-being of their populations. The present
paper also models the private sector in an elementary way. Countries are undi¤erentiated in
their ability to produce private goods and the production process is static. Future research
should thus consider how international competition is able to impact the growth process
of these competing economies when private productivity di¤ers between jurisdictions.
26It is convenient to show that k = ( 14 )
1
3
1
r .
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A Appendix
A.1 Solution of the di¤erential game in Section 3.
Wedene as follows the notion of heterogenous strategic behavior that is used in Dockner
et al., 2000, pages 8792.27
Denition 1 A 2-tuple (	1;	2) of functions 	1 : [0; 1]  [0;+1) ! R2+ and 	2 :
[0;+1) ! R2+, with 	1 = (	11(S; t);	12(S; t));8(S; t) 2 [0; 1]  [0;+1) and 	2 =
(21(t);	22(t)), is called a heterogenous Strategic Nash Equilibrium if, for each i = 1; 2, an
optimal control path (ai(); Ti) of player i exists and is given by the Markovian Strategy for
player 1: (a1(t); T1(t)) = (	11(S(t); t);	12(S(t); t)) = 	1(S(t); t), and open-loop strategy
for player 2: (a2(t); T2(t)) = (	21(t);	22(t)) = 	2(t).
The small open economy (the Markovian strategic player) takes the large countrys
(open loop) strategy 	2(t) as given, and hence, faces the following optimization problem:8>><>>:
max
a1;T1
Z 1
0
e rt

(S(t)T1(S; t))
1
2   
2
a21(S; t)

;
subject to _S(t) =
a1(S; t)  T1(S; t)
k
  	21(t) 	22(t)
k
:
(7)
The corresponding current-value Hamiltonian is
H1(T1; S; a1; 1) =

S
1
2 (t)T
1
2
1 (S; t) 

2
a21(S; t)

+1

a1(S; t)  T1(S; t)
k
  	21(t) 	22(t)
k

where 1 denotes a costate variable.
The large economy faces the following problem:8>><>>:
max
a2;T2
Z 1
0
e rt

((1  S(t))T2(t)) 12   1
2
a22(t)

;
subject to _S(t) =
	11(S; t) 	12(S; t)
k
  a2(t)  T2(t)
k
:
(8)
27Di¤erent but similar idea of guessing symmetric strategies via Pontryagin maximum principle are also
used in several studies by Cellini and Lambertini (2004 and 2007 and the references therein).
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The large country conjectures that the small economys strategies are 	11(S; t) =

k
1(t)
and	12(S; t) =

k
21(t)
2
S, 8S 2 [0; 1] and t  0.2829 Thus, the current-value Hamiltonian
of the large economy is dened as
H2(T2; S; a2; 2) =

(1  S(t)) 12T
1
2
2 (t) 
1
2
a22(t)

+2

	11(S; t) 	12(S; t)
k
  a2(t)  T2(t)
k

with 2 its costate variable.
The rst order conditions yield the small economys equilibrium choices T1(S; t) =
k
21
2
S, a1(S; t) = 1k . The costate variable veries the equation
_1(t) = r1   k41 with
the transversality condition limt!1 e rt1(t)S(t) = 0.
The optimal choices of the big economy are a2(t) =  2(t)k , T2(t) =

k
22(t)
2
(1  S(t))
with the costate equation
_2(t) = r2   k
42
+
k
4
2
21
: (9)
The associated transversality condition is limt!1 e rt2(t)S(t) = 0.
Moreover, we can readily check that the maximized HamiltonianH1 (S; 1) andH

2 (S; 2)
are given by
H1(S; 1; t) =
"
k
21
S   
2

1
k
2#
+ 1
 
1
k
  ( k
21
)2S
k
  ( 
2
k
)  ( k
22
)2(1  S)
k
!
and
H2(S; 2; t) =
"
  k
22
(1  S)  1
2

 2
k
2#
+2
 
1
k
  ( k
21
)2S
k
  ( 
2
k
)  ( k
22
)2(1  S)
k
!
:
28There may be di¤erent strategies to choose, such as the one presented by Cellini and Lambertini(2007).
Here, we only study one of its kind.
29The guessing of the others strategies comes from open-loop strategy: Suppose both players play
open-loop strategies, then their current value open-loop Hamiltonian functions can be easily written down
and so do their rst order conditions, respectively. The rst order conditions o¤er the optimal open-loop
strategies, provided some su¢ cient conditions are checked. Suppose those optimal open-loop strategies are:
	1(t) = 	1(S(t); 1(t); t) and 	2(t) = 	1(S(t); 2(t); t), for any t. In the guessing process, the open-loop
strategy player( here, the large economy) takes the small economys open-loop strategy as conjectured
strategy with the following modication: large economy guesses that strategy 	1(t) = 	1(S(t); t) will be
	1(S; t) with any state variable S, since the small economy plays Markovian strategy. Therefore, the large
economy guess that the small economys strategy is: 	1(S; t) = 	1(S; (t); t), for any (S; t).
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It is straightforward that the maximized Hamiltonian are concave with respect to
the state variable S, hence, ai(t); Ti(t) (i = 1; 2) are optimal paths. Therefore, the
large countrys conjecture about the rivals strategy is optimal. Therefore, the solutions
	1(S; t) = (a1(S; t); T1(S; t)) and 	2(t) = (a1(t); T2(t)) for S 2 [0; 1] and t  0 is one pair
of Nash Equilibria. QED.
A.2 Steady states
The long run solutions of the above dynamic system are given as follows:
Proposition 5 At the Nash equilibrium, for any given parameters ; k; r; i; i = 1; 2 , there
is a potential interior steady state
bS = 1
6
p
2

1
kr
 3
2
(
p
2

  1) + 2
3
; (10)
ba1 = 1
2

1
kr
 1
2
; bT1 = krbS; ba2 = 1
2

1
2kr
 1
2
; bT2 = 2kr(1  bS); (11)
with the costate variables b1 = 12  kr  12 ; b2 =  12   k2r 12 . Notice that he steady state is a
saddle point of the canonical system and it is one dimensional locally asymptotically stable.
A.3 Trajectories
The above analysis shows that there is a stable trajectory associated with the dynamic
system. In this subsection, we explore the convergence path to make clear how the steady
state is attained. Taking into account of the initial and transversality conditions, the FOCs
yield the explicit trajectories
1(t) =
1
2

k
r
 1
2
; 2(t) =   1
2

k
2r
 1
2
:
The state trajectory becomes
S(t) = (S(0)  bS)e 3rt + bS (12)
which is the optimal convergence path leading to the steady state. The convergence speed
is 3r.
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A.4 State constraint S(t)  S < 12
Recalling that the small countrys size is constrained (S(t)  S < 1
2
), we adapt the
Lagrangian function as follows
L1(T1; S; a1; 1) =
h
S
1
2 (t)T
1
2
1 (S; t)  2a21(S; t)
i
+ 1

a1(S; t)  T1(S; t)
k
 a2(t)  T2(t)
k

+(S   S):
The above rst order conditions still hold, except the costate variable which now veries
the equation _1(t) = r1  k41 + . Furthermore, we introduce the Kuhn-Tucker condition

 
S   S = 0:
In other words, we have, either S < S with  = 0 or S = S with   0. However, since the
small economys size is constrained by the upper-bound S, we impose that  = 0 whenever
S = S. QED.
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